HaG: Hash graph based key predistribution scheme for multiphase wireless sensor networks by Sarımurat, Salim et al.
HaG: Hash Graph Based Key Predistribution Scheme 
for Multiphase Wireless Sensor Networks 
Salim Sarımurat and Albert Levi 
Computer Science and Engineering 
Sabanci University 
Istanbul, Turkey 
{sarimurat, levi}@sabanciuniv.edu 
 
 
Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) consist of small 
sensor nodes which operate until their energy reserve is depleted. 
These nodes are generally deployed to the environments where 
network lifespan is much longer than the lifetime of a node. 
Therefore, WSN are typically operated in a multiphase fashion, 
as in [1-3, 9-10], which use different key pools for nodes deployed 
at different generations. In multiphase WSN, new nodes are 
periodically deployed to the environment to ensure constant local 
and global network connectivity. Also, key ring of these newly 
deployed nodes is selected from their deployment generation key 
pool to improve the resiliency of WSN. In this paper, we propose 
a key predistribution scheme for multiphase WSN which is 
resilient against permanent and temporary node capture attacks. 
In our Hash Graph based (HaG) scheme, every generation has its 
own key pool which is generated using the key pool of the 
previous generation. This allows nodes deployed at different 
generations to have the ability to establish secure channels. 
Likewise, a captured node can only be used to obtain keys for a 
limited amount of successive generations. We compare the 
connectivity and resiliency performance of our scheme with other 
multiphase key predistribution schemes and show that our 
scheme performs better when the attack rate is low. When the 
attack rate is high, our scheme still has better resiliency 
performance inasmuch as using less key ring size compared to 
the existing multiphase schemes. 
Keywords—Wireless sensor networks, security, key 
predistribution, generation keys, multiphase. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are composed of sensor 
nodes which have limited amount of memory, energy and 
computation power. In typical application settings, sensor 
nodes are spread randomly over an environment and collect 
data that is transferred to a trusted central point for further 
examination [4]. Most of these application scenarios require 
long term sensing of the environment and energy reserve of the 
sensor nodes last for a very limited time. Therefore, deploying 
new nodes to the environment in certain intervals, called 
generations, is the only way to have stable network 
connectivity. Since the network lifespan is much longer than 
the lifetime of a sensor node, it is most likely that we have 
multiple generations while sensing an environment. Networks 
that provide this property are called Multiphase WSN.  
This paper presents a new key predistribution scheme based 
on hash graphs of keys that provides secure communication 
between sensor nodes deployed at different generations. In our 
Hash Graph based (HaG) scheme, each deployment generation 
has its own key pool and these pools are generated using the 
pool of the previous generation. Key pool of the first 
generation is randomly generated and the subsequent 
generations use two consecutive keys of the preceding 
generation to form a key for the next generation. More 
specifically, two sequential keys are XORed (i.e. logical 
Exclusive Disjunction operation) and hashed together using a 
secure hash function to constitute a key of the next generation 
key pool. When two nodes are in the communication range, 
they use the generation that they have been deployed to the 
network in conjunction with the identification numbers to 
decide whether they have a common key or not. If they can 
find at least one common key, then nodes perform XOR 
operation on all common keys to generate a direct link key that 
is used for secure communication. With the HaG scheme, a 
temporary attacker can only compromise some portion of the 
network and right after the attack stops, scheme self-heals the 
keys until the compromised key ratio decreases to zero. 
Similarly, a permanent attacker is only able to compromise 
some steady fraction of the network. Compared to other 
multiphase schemes, HaG scheme provides better in resiliency 
if the attack rate is low. If the attack rate is high, we have some 
considerable improvements on the resiliency as well. Using a 
smaller amount of keys, HaG scheme delivers same 
connectivity rate with better resiliency performance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next 
section summarizes existing key predistribution methods. We 
provide detailed information about the scheme that we are 
proposing in Section III. Section IV discusses the comparative 
performance evaluation of our scheme and RoK scheme and 
finally Section V concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Depending on the application area of the WSN, security of the 
communication becomes an important criterion. There exist 
various solutions to the key predistribution problem, such as 
full pairwise [5], probabilistic [5, 6] and matrix-based 
approaches [7, 8]. Full pairwise scheme proposed by Chan et 
al. loads ݊ െ ͳ pairwise keys to every node of the ݊ nodes in 
the network [5]. Although this scheme provides high level of 
security, it requires high amount of memory on the sensor 
nodes to store pairwise keys. Besides, addition of new nodes to 
the network is only possible if pairwise keys of them are 
preloaded to the nodes that are deployed before.  
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In probabilistic schemes, nodes receive a group of 
randomly selected keys, amount of which is enough for having 
a good connectivity percentage over the network. Although 
probabilistic schemes are less secure compared to the full 
pairwise scheme, they circumvent the memory overhead and 
require nodes to store only some predefined amount of keys in 
their memory. Practically all of the probabilistic schemes have 
three stages: key predistribution, shared key discovery and path 
key establishment. Eschenauer and Gligor’s well-known Basic 
Scheme [6] is one example for the probabilistic schemes. In 
key predistribution phase, each sensor node is loaded with ߬ 
keys that are randomly selected from a key pool of size ܲ 
where ߬ ا ܲ. After deployment, sensor nodes try to discover 
their neighbors. When two neighboring nodes find at least one 
common key, then they can create a direct link to communicate 
securely. If no common key exists, then nodes start the path 
key establishment phase and they try to create a direct link with 
the help of their common neighbors. When we evaluate the 
performance of the Basic scheme, since ߬ ا ܲ, majority of the 
keys will be loaded on multiple nodes and this decreases the 
resiliency. Finding neighbors with common keys, called local 
connectivity, is also an important criterion of the WSN, 
therefore the value of ߬ should be selected wisely to balance 
resiliency and local connectivity. Considering this weakness of 
the Basic Scheme, Chan et al. [5] have proposed a modification 
on the Basic Scheme, known as Q-Composite Scheme, which 
requires two nodes to have at least ݍ ൐ ͳ keys in common in 
order to establish a secure direct link. This improvement 
increases the resiliency of the scheme, but decreases the 
connectivity of the network. 
In the literature, we also have deterministic key 
predistribution approaches which are developed from the idea 
of Blom [7]. Generating one public and one private matrices 
and storing only ߣ ൅ ͳ  keys from these matrices allow the 
nodes to generate a secure direct key with any of the nodes in 
the network.  However, compromising more than ߣ nodes in 
the network will compromise all of the keys used in the 
network. Du et al. [8] propose a combination of the Basic 
Scheme [6] and Blom’s Scheme [7] without increasing ߣ value. 
This Multiple Space Key Predistribution scheme provides very 
good resilience but it has higher memory requirement and 
communication overhead. 
Up to now, all discussed key predistribution schemes are 
intended for single phase WSN. Even though they allow node 
additions to the network, it is not a stress-free and secure 
operation. Furthermore, modification of single phase WSN key 
predistribution solutions to adapt multiphase network has the 
weakness of continuous usage of the same key pool for 
multiple generations. Keys captured by an attacker at any time 
can be used in the course of the network’s operation time. 
However, with multiphase WSN, we can use different 
generation pools that are completely different from the key 
pools used in other generations. This way, an attacker would 
only be able to compromise some portion of the network and 
after some time, the percentage of the compromised nodes will 
become stable if the attack is permanent. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are only a few key predistribution schemes 
addressing multiple deployments of the sensor nodes, i.e. 
multiphase WSN [1-4, 9-10]. 
Robust Key predistribution (RoK) scheme is a multiphase 
scheme proposed by Castelluccia et al. [1]. RoK has forward 
and backward key pools for each generation. Keys in these 
pools are randomly generated and they are updated in forward 
and backward orders by hashing. Nodes are loaded with equal 
number of keys having the same key identifier from forward 
and backward key pools. Lifetime of node is constrained by 
݅ ൅ ܩ௪  generations where ݅ is the deployment generation of the 
node and ܩ௪  is the generation window. A node can only 
produce forward keys for generation j where ݆ ൐ ݅ , and 
backward keys for generation j where ݆ ൏ ݅ ൅ ܩ௪ െ ͳ. When 
two nodes are in communication range, they exchange their 
generation number and node identifier. Using these values, 
they calculate the identifier of the keys that are loaded on the 
node to be communicated and if they find at least one match, 
then they create the session key and start the secure 
communication. When an attacker captures a node from 
generation ݅, he would only be able to compromise keys that 
are used between generations ሿ݅ǡ ݅ ൅ ܩ௪ሾ  because of the 
generation window boundary. Therefore, attacker should be 
capture at some rate permanently to have some portion of the 
network compromised. Even if he permanently captures nodes, 
he would only be able to compromise some portion of the 
network and as soon as he stops the captures, this percentage 
will start decreasing and become zero after some time. 
However, this scheme requires number of generations to be 
determined before starting the network because of the offline 
backward key pool generation phase. Also, sensor nodes use 
high computational power to update forward keys at every 
generation time. 
Random Generation Material (RGM) scheme [2-3] is 
another multiphase WSN key predistribution method proposal. 
RGM scheme has one key pool for every generation and there 
is no relation between key pools of different generations. 
Nodes are loaded with generation keys ݃݇௧௚௚  where ݃  is the 
generation that the node is deployed and ݐ is the identification 
number of the key. Communication between different 
generations is provided with keys that are generated by 
XORing the keys between the generations of two nodes. Then 
the XORed key is hashed and used to create a direct link 
between two nodes in different generations. Compared to the 
RoK scheme, RGM has better resilience because keys 
compromised from two nodes are only used in the generations 
that these nodes are deployed. Also, RGM has no limit on the 
deployment of the number of nodes to the network. However, 
increasing ܩ௪  value also increases the communication and 
computation cost of this scheme. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
This section describes our hash graph based key 
predistribution scheme proposal for multiphase wireless sensor 
networks. 
A. Overview 
Sensor nodes have very limited amount of energy reserve 
that limits their lifetime to a small period of time. Typically, 
this limited lifetime of sensor nodes is very short compared to 
the lifetime of the network. Hence, new sensor nodes need to 
be deployed to the network in some intervals called 
generations.  
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The symbols and notations we use for our scheme in the 
rest of the paper are listed in Table I below. 
TABLE I.  LIST OF SYMBOLS USED IN OUR SCHEME 
Symbol Definition 
ܲ Key pool size 
ܩ௪ Generation window 
ܭܲ௝ Key pool at generation ݆ 
ܭ ஺ܴ௝ Key ring of node ܣ at generation ݆ 
݇௧௝  Key with index ݐ at generation ݆ 
݇݃௧௝  Key group with index ݐ at generation ݆ 
݇஺஻ Direct link key between nodes ܣ and ܤ 
݄ሺήሻ Secure hash function ݄ǣሼͲǡͳሽכ ՜ ሼͲǡͳሽଵ଺଴ 
݂ሺήሻ Hash function ݄ǣሼͲǡͳሽכ ՜ ሼͲǡͳሽ௉Ȁ௚ 
݃ Number of key ring groups that are drawn from key pool 
݊ Number of key groups in the key ring of a node 
݉ Number of keys in the key ring of a node at the initial deployment time 
Lifetime of a sensor is bounded by ܩ௪ generations, which 
is referred as generation window, as in [1]. A node deployed at 
generation ݅ will drain its battery before generation ݅ ൅ ܩ௪ and 
each generation period is assumed to be 1 in the rest of the 
paper. A node that is deployed at generation ݆ should be able to 
establish a secure channel with the nodes that are deployed 
between ሾ݆ െ ܩ௪ǡ ݆ ൅ ܩ௪ሿ generation periods. 
There are three procedures for our scheme: key pool 
generation, key ring predistribution and pairwise key 
establishment. Specifics of these procedures are explained in 
the subsections below. 
B. Key Pool Generation 
Key pool of our scheme is updated at each generation. Our 
initial key pool has P randomly generated keys. When the 
generation period ends, two consecutive keys are XORed and 
hashed with a secure hash function ݄ǣሼͲǡͳሽכ ՜ ሼͲǡͳሽଵ଺଴, such 
as SHA1, to generate one key from key pool of the next 
generation. 
Initial key pool of the network is defined as follows: 
ܭܲ଴ ൌ ሼ݇ଵ଴ǡ ݇ଶ଴ǡ ݇ଷ଴ǡ ݇ସ଴ǡ ݇ହ଴ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇௉ିଵ଴ ǡ ݇௉଴ሽ 
where each ݇௜଴ value is randomly generated. 
The construction process of the generation key graph 
structure is depicted in Figure 1 below. To put it in more 
concrete terms: if the key pool at generation ݆  is defined as 
ܭܲ௝ ൌ ൛݇ଵ௝ǡ ݇ଶ௝ǡ ݇ଷ௝ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇௉ିଵ௝ ǡ ݇௉௝ ൟ, then key pool at generation 
݆ ൅ ͳ  is ܭܲ௝ାଵ ൌ ൛݇ଵ௝ାଵǡ ݇ଶ௝ାଵǡ ݇ଷ௝ାଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݇௉ିଵ௝ାଵ ǡ ݇௉௝ାଵൟ  where 
݇௧௝ାଵ ൌ ݄൫݇௧௝۩݇௧ାଵ௝ ൯. To reserve the key pool size P in every 
generation, ݇௉௝ାଵ key is generated randomly and added to the 
end of ܭܲ௝ାଵ key pool. 
C. Key Ring Predistribution 
In our scheme, we pre-distribute keys in groups of ݃ keys 
from the generation key pool of size ܲ. Each node has ݉ keys 
that can be used to communicate with other nodes that are 
deployed to the environment at the same generation. Thus, 
nodes are loaded with ݊ ൌ ݉ ݃ൗ  different key groups from the 
key pool of their deployment generation. These key groups are 
selected using a pseudorandom function ݂ሺήሻ which does not 
produce consecutive numbers for the same node. For example, 
the first key group of the node A deployed at generation ݆ is 
݂ሺ݅݀஺ צ ͳ צ ݆ሻ  which contains keys in ሾ݂ሺ݅݀஺ צ ͳ צ ݆ሻ ൈ݃ǡ ݂ሺ݅݀஺ צ ͳ צ ݆ሻ ൈ ሺ݃ ൅ ͳሻሾ range. 
 
Figure 1.  Key pool generation and pairwise key estanblishment in our scheme
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More precisely, key ring of node ܣ is constructed as: 
ܭܴ஺௝ ൌ ൛݇݃௧௝ȁݐ ൌ ݂ሺ݅݀஺ צ ݅ צ ݆ሻǡ ݅ ൌ ͳǡ ʹǡ ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ൟ 
where ݇݃௧௝ ൌ ቄ݇௧ൈ௚௝ାଵǡ ݇௧ൈ௚ାଵ௝ାଵ ǡ ݇௧ൈ௚ାଶ௝ାଵ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሺ௧ାଵሻൈ௚ିଵ௝ାଵ ቅ. 
Distribution of keys in groups allows nodes to have better 
chances of communication with nodes deployed in the future 
generations. We also make sure that our pseudorandom 
function ݂ሺήሻ does not give two consecutive group numbers 
for the same node; because this will give the attacker the 
advantage to compromise keys for more generations, and 
eventually reduce the resiliency of the scheme faster. For the 
same reason, we suggest that the number of keys in groups, ݃ 
value, should be determined close to ܩ௪ ʹΤ ; based on the 
observations on age distribution of the nodes provided in [1]. 
When the generation period ends, nodes should 
immediately generate the keys of the succeeding generation 
and delete the keys from the past generation key pool. This 
improves the resiliency of the network intensely because 
nodes that are not yet captured by an attacker will not disclose 
as much key as they would, if they were to store the keys of 
the past generations. 
Our scheme has both forward and backward secrecy 
features. Forward secrecy, meaning the security of the future 
generation keys, is provided by using two sequential keys to 
produce a key in the next generation. If an attacker captures a 
node, he will only be able to compromise keys for ݃ 
generations. Backward secrecy, meaning the security of past 
keys, is provided by the secure hash function ݄ሺήሻ and attacker 
is not able to recover any of the past keys even he captures all 
of the alive nodes in the network. 
D. Pairwise Key Establishment 
Nodes start pairwise key establishment phase right after 
being deployed to the environment. When a sensor node A, 
with node identifier ݅݀஺ , is deployed to the network at 
generation ݆, it broadcast a message containing these values. 
Neighbor nodes can use this message to construct the key ring 
ܭܴ஺௝  and using this key list, they can check whether they have 
at least one key in common or not.  
If node A is deployed at generation ݆  and node B is 
deployed at generation ݅  where ݅ ൑ ݆ , then they can find a 
common key in ሾ݆ǡ ݅ ൅ ܩ௪ሾ generation interval. If they find at 
least one common key, then they XOR all common keys and 
then hash them to generate ݇஺஻ which will be used to secure 
the communication between nodes A and B. 
E. Example 
In this section, we provide an example for the pairwise key 
establishment phase. As seen in Figure 1, we have two nodes, 
A and B, that are deployed at generations ݆  and ݆ ൅ ͵ 
consecutively, with a generation window ܩ௪ ൌ ͷ. Key rings of 
these nodes are as follows: 
ܭܴ஺௝ ൌ ൛ǥ ǡ ݇௧௝ǡ ݇௧ାଵ௝ ǡ ݇௧ାଶ௝ ǡ ݇௧ାଷ௝ ǡ ݇௧ାସ௝ ǡ ݇௧ା଼௝ ǡ ݇௧ାଽ௝ ǡ ݇௧ାଵ଴௝ ǡǥ ൟ 
ܭܴ஻௝ ൌ ൛ǥ ǡ ݇௧ାଵ௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ାଶ௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ାଷ௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ାସ௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ାହ௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ା଻௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ା଼௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ାଽ௝ାଷǡ ǥ ൟ 
Using these keys, node A and B can only communicate in 
generations ݆ ൅ ͵  and ݆ ൅ Ͷ  using the set of 
൛݇௧ାଵ௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ା଼௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ାଽ௝ାଷǡ ݇௧ା଼௝ାସൟ keys in ݇஺஻௝ାଷ ൌ ݄൫݇௧ାଵ௝ାଷ۩݇௧ା଼௝ାଷ۩݇௧ାଽ௝ାଷ൯ 
and ݇஺஻௝ାଷ ൌ ݄൫݇௧ା଼௝ାସ൯  manner. However, they cannot 
communicate in any other generation using these two key 
groups. 
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Simulation Setup 
We performed several simulations and compared our 
scheme with RoK scheme. In these simulations, we have set 
the key pool size to 10,000 keys for both schemes. We have 
placed sensor nodes to the environment in totally random 
manner to have more realistic simulations. We have used 1,000 
sensors on ͶͲͲ݉ݔͶͲͲ݉  square environment. 
Communication range for nodes is set to ͶͲ݉. ܩ௪ is set to 10 
and sensor nodes have a random lifetime that is determined 
using a Normal distribution function with meanܩ௪ ʹΤ  and 
standard deviation ܩ௪ ͸Τ  as in [1]. As explained before, ݃ 
value is set to be 5 which is ܩ௪ ʹΤ . We have also assumed that 
each generation consists of 10 small time units called rounds. 
Dead nodes are replaced with new randomly placed nodes at 
the beginning of each generation. Simulations are run for 30 
generations. Also, we have run all of our simulations for 25 
times and took their average values. 
B. Connectivity Analysis 
Simulations on connectivity analysis of RoK and HaG 
schemes are done using key ring sizes of 200, 220 and 250 
keys. Nodes are moved using random walk mobility model and 
no changes observed for different network topologies.  
Global Connectivity of the network stands for the 
percentage of the largest key sharing graph members over the 
size of the network. With the specified key ring sizes, both 
RoK and our scheme have 100% global connectivity. 
Local Connectivity stands for the probability that any two 
neighbor sensor nodes share at least one common key in their 
ring. Figure 2 shows the Local Connectivity values for both 
RoK and HaG schemes using different key ring sizes. As seen 
from this figure, nodes in both schemes have 0.8 Local 
Connectivity value when using 220 keys for HaG scheme and 
250 keys for RoK scheme. For a WSN, having 80% Local 
Connectivity can be considered as more than enough for secure 
communication in the network. 
 
Figure 2.  Local Connectivity of Rok and Our Scheme 
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C. Resiliency Analysis 
In our simulations, attacker actively captures 1, 3 and 5 
random nodes per round and compromises all of the keys 
available in their memory. Key ring size is set to 220 for HaG 
scheme and 250 for RoK scheme in order to have the same 
local connectivity value, which is around 0.8 as seen in Figure 
2. Figure 3 and 4 shows the resiliency comparison of RoK 
scheme and our scheme; the lower the resiliency, the better. In 
summary, our simulations have shown that HaG scheme 
outperforms RoK scheme in resiliency by using smaller key 
ring size. 
Active resiliency ratio is calculated using nodes that are 
currently alive and has some keys compromised because 
attacker has captured some other nodes that are able to 
communicate. As it can be seen in Figure 3, active resiliency 
ratio reaches its highest value in around 10th generation when 
most of the nodes that are deployed at the 5th generation are 
still alive. After 10th generation, nodes that are deployed at 5th 
generation start to die because their lifetime is determined with 
the aforementioned Normal distribution. Our results show that 
our scheme performs nearly 50% better when the attack rate is 
low, i.e. attacker captures 1 node per round. Although 
increasing attack rate affects the performance of our scheme 
negatively and it increases in a faster way, our results are still 
better than RoK scheme with attack rate of 5 nodes per round. 
 
Figure 3.  Active Resiliency of RoK and Our Scheme with an eager attacker 
having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round 
 
Figure 4.  Total  Resiliency of RoK and Our Scheme with a temporary 
attacker having capture rates of 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round 
Total resiliency is calculated by considering all dead (i.e. 
captured) or alive links that are established over the course of 
the network. Our simulations have shown that total resiliency 
of HaG scheme also outperforms the RoK scheme as it can be 
seen in Figure 4. Similar to the active resiliency, HaG scheme 
has nearly 50% better results when the attack rate is low. When 
the attack rate increases, HaG scheme still has lower total 
resiliency rate compared to the RoK scheme. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose a new key predistribution scheme 
that is designed for multiphase wireless sensor networks. Our 
scheme starts with an initial set of random key pool that 
evolves over time, in a graph fashion, to generate key pools for 
the subsequent generations. Sensors deployed at different 
generations start with a key ring that is randomly selected from 
the key pool of their deployment generation in groups. 
Deploying keys in groups increase connectivity and decreases 
resiliency. An attacker capturing a node can only compromise 
keys for generations bounded by the key group size. 
Our simulations have shown that after anchoring the local 
connectivity value to 0.8 for both our scheme and RoK scheme, 
resiliency performance of our scheme is 50% better when the 
attack rate is small. When the attack rate increases, our scheme 
performs at a rate that is close to the performance of RoK but 
still better.  
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